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Abstract 
 
The South African jurisprudence on the rights of children is 
vibrant and generally progressive, and is supported by an 
enabling constitutional and statutory framework. The majority 
decision in Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC), however, 
ignores the rights of children, and this is in stark contrast to some 
of the minority judgments in the same case. This contrast is 
surprising, considering that all of the judges applied the same 
legal framework. With reference to an emerging interest in 
defining children's rights approaches to judging, this article 
critically analyses the majority and minority judgments, and 
establishes their vulnerabilities and strengths as children's rights 
judgments. In the process, suggestions are made in relation to 
defining a children's rights approach to judging. 
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1  Introduction 
Litigating children's rights is no longer a novelty in South Africa. In an 
enabling constitutional and statutory context,1 courts are often called on to 
decide matters concerning children. Much progress has been made through 
litigation in terms of individual outcomes for children and in relation to the 
rights of children generally.2 One question arises nonetheless, and it is 
whether the formal legal protection (constitutional and statutory) cemented 
through a vibrant children's rights jurisprudence has led to judges 
embracing a children's rights perspective or approach to adjudication. The 
concern is that while a general legal framework for the protection of the 
rights of children exists, judges may not give such rights sufficiently careful 
consideration.  
This concern is perhaps best understood in a historical context.3 The 
modern preoccupation with the legal protection of children started as a 
concern for their physical and emotional protection. From a legal 
perspective, and in broad terms, this translated into the legal recognition 
(through statute or common law) of child welfare as a principle guiding 
decision making concerning children. Decisions in selected matters (usually 
family law or child protection) centred on the "welfare principle", which was 
later replaced to a certain extent with the concept of "the best interests of 
the child".4 While both the "welfare" and the "best interests" notions 
purported to put the children's welfare at the centre of the decision making, 
the very wide discretion enjoyed by courts, the adult perspective which 
dominated the process, and concerns that the welfare assessment served 
the interests of the adults more than genuinely promoting the interests of 
children have led to concerns about the ability of the welfare approach to 
                                            
*  Meda Couzens. Law (Cluj-Napoca), MA (Bucharest), LLM (London), MChPr (UKZN, 
Durban). Honorary research fellow School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Durban, South Africa. Work on this contribution started as a part of the Children's 
Rights Judgments Project (hereafter the CRJP) initiated by Professors Helen 
Stalford and Kathryn Hollingsworth of the University of Liverpool and the University 
of Newcastle respectively. I am grateful for their support and for the thought-
provoking discussions at the workshops in Liverpool (March 2015) and Cardiff (April 
2016). The other contributions to the project are published in Stalford, Hollingsworth 
and Gilmore Rewriting Children's Rights Judgments. I am also grateful for the input 
received from Ms Willene Holness and Associate Professor Ed Couzens. Any 
mistakes are mine. Email: Couzensm@ukzn.ac.za 
1  There are numerous legal instruments which protect the rights of children in South 
Africa, starting with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter 
the Constitution), especially its s 28, and specialist legislation such as the Children's 
Act 38 of 2005 and the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, to name but a few.  
2  Skelton "South Africa" 13. 
3  For a review of the historical and theoretical development of children's rights, see 
Human "Theory of Children's Rights" 243.  
4  This shift in terminology (and to a certain extent substance) has occurred under the 
influence of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
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serve children.5 With the substantial development in human rights protection 
and the penetration of rights into many aspects of the socio-legal landscape, 
child-related matters also came to be conceptualised in a rights framework. 
The legal endorsement of the rights of children presented an opportunity to 
address some of the shortcomings of a "welfare approach" by introducing 
more structure and transparency into decision-making concerning children.6 
The premise of this reasoning is that the rigorous application of technical 
legal rules (ie the human rights) would lead to a positive change in judicial 
decision-making. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 and 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 have 
contributed to this process by giving legal contour to the rights of children 
internationally. In South Africa the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) has played an essential role by 
legitimising reliance on the rights of children in the legal discourse and by 
contributing substantially to the effective protection of children's rights.  
However, has this shift toward thinking about children in a rights framework 
led to courts adopting a children's rights perspective,7 and consequently 
delivering to children the benefits which the rights framework promised? 
Have legal instruments protecting the rights of children led to courts 
embracing a sustained (and sustainable) approach to decision-making, in 
which the rights of children are used as a matter of legal obligation rather 
than on a discretionary basis, dependent on the personal openness of 
individual judges toward the rights of children? Questions of this nature raise 
the inevitable (and inherently wide) question as to what constitutes a 
children's rights approach or perspective to judging.  
Like the concept of children's rights in the past, a "children's rights 
approach" to judging is a concept in search of a definition.8 A fundamental 
issue which still needs to be clarified is to what extent courts can legitimately 
have a "perspective" or embrace a certain "approach" without becoming 
advocates for a cause and consequently compromising their impartiality. 
                                            
5  About concerns in relation to welfare decision-making, see Fortin Children's Rights 
and the Developing Law 22. 
6  For critical views on the application of the welfare principle, especially by English 
courts, see Fortin Children's Rights and the Developing Law 292.  
7  The preoccupation of this contribution is with the children's rights approach being 
taken by judges. This does not mean that such an approach cannot or should not be 
taken by other decision-makers. It is possible nonetheless that a children's rights 
approach may require different things of different decision makers, depending on 
their constitutional functions (ie the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, 
independent human rights institutions, local authorities, etc). 
8  In 1973 Hillary Rodham argued that children's rights were concepts in search of a 
definition (as cited in Tobin "Development of Children's Rights" 25. The aim of the 
CRJP was to generate a discussion of the issue and establish some parameters for 
defining a "children's rights approach/perspective".  
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Much probably depends on a comprehensive definition of the elusive phrase 
"children's rights approach/perspective",9 which this current article does not 
aim to formulate.  
Instead, prompted by the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional 
Court, two related questions are raised in a quest to "peel away" some of 
the layers of this complex phrase and make a modest contribution to giving 
contour to its meaning. The questions addressed here are whether a 
children's rights approach is inherently present in judgments with a child-
favourable outcome; and whether a children's rights perspective arises as 
a matter of necessity from children's rights being entrenched in constitutions 
or children's rights statutes. Both questions are answered in the negative, 
confirming what has been said by other commentators10 - that something 
more is needed than an enabling legal framework (international or national) 
to secure a children's rights approach to judging. 
Acknowledging once more that defining a children's rights approach is work 
in progress, the working definition of a children's rights perspective to 
judging in this piece entails an approach in which the children's rights are 
acknowledged and applied when a decision has the potential to limit them,11 
and they are treated with the legal rigour owed to all legal concepts 
including, where necessary, an understanding and a determination of the 
substantive content of the rights at stake.12 The absence in this primitive 
definition of a reference to a child-favourable outcome is deliberate. In the 
view of the present writer, a child rights approach is not an inherent feature 
of judgments written from a children's rights perspective. Arguably, a child 
rights imprimatur is given by the reasoning of the court, rather than by an 
outcome which may be intrinsically linked to the facts of a case. 
There may be a temptation to dismiss the elements of the above definition 
as the self-evident tasks of courts in all matters, child-related or not. This 
contribution will show, however, that such features are not to be taken for 
                                            
9  Tobin "Development of Children's Rights" 26 uses a different terminology: he writes 
of a "'rights-based' approach to matters dealing with children" and acknowledges the 
elusive meaning of the phrase. 
10  Tobin "Development of Children's Rights" 36. 
11  Arguably, this approach finds support in ss 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution, which 
provide for the obligation of the state to "respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights 
in the Bill of Rights", and stress the binding nature of the Bill of Rights for the courts, 
inter alia. However, a determination that children's rights are relevant in a particular 
dispute may not be easy to make, especially when the matter concerns children 
indirectly and the children are not involved in the litigation. 
12  Tobin mentions the understanding of the legal content of a right as one of the 
features of a child rights approach, but in a wider decision-making framework (Tobin 
"Development of Children's Rights" 37). This feature is apposite for a children's rights 
approach by courts and is consequently included by the present author in the above 
definition.  
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granted in what remains the developing field of children's rights. 
Acknowledging that children's rights are engaged or relevant in concrete 
disputes requires judges to look deeper into the matters before them. At 
times this involves considering the position of children who are not parties 
to disputes or anticipating the consequences of litigation on them. It may 
also require that when judges apply the law, especially in those fields not 
within the habitual scope of application of the rights of children, they ask 
themselves (to the extent that they are constitutionally authorised to do so)13 
if the law is sufficiently adapted to respond to the position of children as 
legal subjects that are different from adults.  
The objectives of this article are pursued by analysing, from the perspective 
of the above definition, the approaches taken by the majority in Le Roux v 
Dey14 and Yacoob J's dissent (in which he was joined by Skweyiya J) in the 
same case. The reasoning of the majority marginalises the rights of children, 
and it is clearly not a judgment in which a children's rights approach has 
been taken. By contrast, Yacoob J's judgment is a child-centred judgment, 
but, arguably, not necessarily a judgement written from a children's rights 
perspective. While Yacoob J acknowledges the importance of the rights of 
children and their relevance to the dispute, there is some lack of clarity in 
how rights are used as well as their content which prevents this judgment 
from being the landmark children's rights judgment which it could have 
otherwise become.  
This contribution is structured as follows. Part 2 provides a brief 
presentation of the case and is followed in part 3 by a presentation of the 
judgments written by the Constitutional Court judges. Part 4 discusses the 
importance of the case for the development of children's rights, and is 
followed in part 5 by a critique of the judgments from a children's rights 
perspective. Conclusions are drawn in part 6, where observations are made 
in relation to the contribution of this case to understanding what a children's 
rights approach is or ought to be. 
2  Brief presentation of the case  
The case concerns a prank played by three teenaged schoolchildren (one 
aged 15-and-a-half, and two aged 17) on the deputy principal of their high 
school in Pretoria. They manipulated a picture downloaded from the internet 
by superimposing the heads of the deputy principal (Dr Dey) and the 
                                            
13  In a South African constitutional context, judges are authorised and even required to 
do so because the Bill of Rights (which includes the rights of children in s 28) "applies 
to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of 
state" (s 8(1) of the Constitution). 
14  Le Roux v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as 
Amici Curiae) 2011 3 SA 274 (CC) (hereafter Le Roux). 
M COUZENS PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  6 
principal on a picture representing two naked men in a position suggestive 
of sexual activity. The genitals of the two men were covered by the image 
of the school crest. The picture was crudely executed, and it was clear that 
the naked bodies in the picture were not those of the teachers. The picture 
was distributed by one of the boys via a cell phone and one of the recipients 
placed the picture on the school noticeboard. The boys were subjected to 
disciplinary proceedings at school and to pre-trial diversion (in the form of 
community work) for crimen injuria against Dr Dey.  
The deputy principal also sued the boys for two common law delicts: 
defamation (injury to one's reputation) and infringement of his dignity (injury 
to his feelings of self-worth). The central issue was whether the image 
manipulated by the defendants was defamatory of Dr Dey and injured his 
dignity. Defamation has been defined as the wrongful and intentional 
publication of a defamatory statement.15 For a publication (a picture in this 
case) to be defamatory it has to have a meaning likely to lower the esteem 
which the plaintiff enjoys in the eyes of others. An action for injury to one's 
feelings (the second cause of action of the plaintiff) protects a person's 
feelings of self-worth against deliberate and wrongful acts which impair 
one's dignity.16 For such action to succeed, the plaintiff must feel insulted 
by the conduct of the defendant, and the conduct of the defendant must also 
be seen as insulting by the reasonable observer.  
The High Court found the boys liable for both delicts,17 while a majority in 
the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) found the boys liable for defamation 
but not for the dignity claim. The boys appealed the SCA judgment to the 
Constitutional Court (the Court). Two amici made submissions to the Court: 
the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) and the Restorative Justice 
Centre (RJC).  
3  The judgements of the Constitutional Court  
Four judgments were written by the Constitutional Court judges, a clear 
indication of the contentiousness of the issue.  
                                            
15  Le Roux para 84 (fn omitted) citing Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 8 BCLR 771 (CC) 
para 18. 
16  In this context, dignity has a narrower meaning than its constitutional counterpart, 
and refers to one's feelings of self-worth (Le Roux para 138).  
17  Children aged 7 to 14 are considered doli incapax (a rebuttable presumption), and 
children between the ages of 14 and 18 are considered doli capax (Schäfer "Division 
E: Young Persons" paras E74 and E75). In Le Roux, the children were considered 
doli capax.  
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3.1 The majority judgment 
Brand AJ for the majority (with Ngcobo CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Khampepe J, 
Mogoeng J and Nkabinde J concurring) found the image defamatory and 
the defendants liable for defamation but not for injury to Dr Dey's dignity. To 
reach its conclusions the Court applied the existing defamation law. The 
meaning of the picture and its alleged defamatory character were to be 
evaluated according to the understanding of a "reasonable person of 
ordinary intelligence".18 On the meaning of the picture, the Court decided 
that although no reasonable person would believe that the naked bodies 
belonged to the teachers, there was an association made/drawn between 
them and the immoral behaviour depicted therein. That association made 
the picture defamatory because it was meant to tarnish the reputation of the 
teachers, to belittle them, to expose them to contempt and disrespect, and 
to ridicule them.19  
The majority rejected various arguments aimed at persuading the Court to 
develop and apply the law of defamation in a way which was more sensitive 
to the defendants' minority. For example, it dismissed arguments that the 
picture was a crude manipulation and that a reasonable observer would not 
believe it to represent the teachers;20 and that the picture was a joke, which 
meant that the defendants lacked the intention to defame.21 The fact that 
the image was created by school children was not an irrelevant 
consideration, as the reasonable observer would know that children often 
poke fun at their teachers.22 However, when a joke "becomes hurtful; when 
it represents the teacher as foolish, ridiculous and unworthy of respect"23 a 
certain line is crossed,24 and the joke becomes defamatory. The FXI sought 
to persuade the Court to develop the defences against wrongfulness so as 
to include the right of children to experiment with satire, as part of their right 
to freedom of expression.25 The majority found it "unnecessary" to deal with 
this argument at length, because it was based on a "rather radical ground", 
which "derives no support from our law as it stands"26 and because it was 
not pleaded at the trial.27 The only aspect on which the minority status of the 
defendants seemed to have carried any weight for the majority was in their 
                                            
18  Le Roux para 39.  
19  Le Roux paras 107, 109. 
20  Le Roux para 103. 
21  Le Roux paras 113-115. 
22  Le Roux para 117. 
23  Le Roux para 119. 
24  Le Roux para 118. 
25  Le Roux paras 120, 123. 
26  Le Roux para 127. 
27  Le Roux para 127. 
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acquiescence to the remedy developed by Froneman J and Cameron J 
(discussed below).  
3.2  The minority judgments 
Yacoob J found that the boys were not liable for any of the delicts. To decide 
that the image was not defamatory, Yacoob J (concurred with in a separate 
judgment by Skweyiya J) decided that simply relying on the "reasonable 
man" test is not apposite and that the Court had to consider "all relevant 
circumstances for the purposes both of interpreting the image and for 
deciding whether its impact is defamatory".28 The image had to be 
construed constitutionally, which implies considering the relevant rights to 
dignity and privacy of Dr Dey, and freedom of expression and the rights of 
children.29 In dealing with the rights of children, Yacoob J set out some of 
the requirements arising from previous children's rights cases.30 These 
constitutional considerations will have a bearing on how the Court should 
proceed if an image can reasonably be interpreted either as defamatory or 
as not defamatory.31 According to Yacoob J, the current law allows a child 
to be held liable for defamation even when a child-friendly interpretation of 
a picture is reasonably possible.32 This approach was incompatible with the 
rights of children, who would not receive adequate protection, and whose 
"vulnerability and weakness are not sufficiently catered for in that 
approach".33 To bring the law in line with the constitutional requirements, he 
proposed the adaptation of a constitutional law rule for the interpretation of 
statutes, suggesting that when both defamatory and non-defamatory 
interpretations are possible "the courts should prefer that interpretation 
which does not hold the child liable provided that the construction is not 
strained".34 
In construing the image from the perspective of the reasonable observer, 
Yacoob J relied on factors which emphasised the uniqueness of the 
children's position,35 including the fact that the image was a challenge to the 
school authority, and was not directed at Dr Dey personally.36 The 
                                            
28  Le Roux para 43. 
29  Le Roux para 44.  
30  Le Roux paras 49-50. The cases relied on by Yacoob J are Centre for Child Law v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 6 SA 632 (CC) and Director 
of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 4 SA 222 (CC). 
31  Le Roux para 51. 
32  Le Roux para 52. 
33  Le Roux para 53. 
34  Le Roux para 54. 
35  Le Roux para 57. 
36  Le Roux para 65. Also see the "reasoning of a reasonable person" according to 
Yacoob J at para 64. 
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reasonable observer has to consider, in respect of images created by 
children, that the "nature of the expression with which we are concerned is 
integrally part of the process of their development and the process of their 
education",37 and that  
… an over-emphasis on the rights of a good name and reputation of a deputy 
principal in relation to the rights of powerless children will be counter-
productive and will be harmful to the interests of children.38  
Froneman J and Cameron J wrote a joint separate judgment, in which they 
found the boys liable for breach of dignity, but not for defaming the plaintiff. 
They shared Yacoob J's view that the image was not defamatory, but found 
that the defendants injured the plaintiff's dignity, in that he felt affronted by 
his association with naked bodies, indecency and homosexuality.39 The two 
judges reduced the quantum of damages awarded by the lower courts, and 
developed the common law so as to include apology as a remedy for 
defamation.40 Their reasoning on remedies does not refer to the rights of 
children, but rather to restorative justice and fairness principles.41  
4  The importance of the case for the rights of children  
Le Roux was the first case in which South African courts engaged with 
defamation by children. The case brought the law of defamation, which 
focuses on the victim and where there is "little scope for treating the child 
defendant differently from the adult defendant",42 face to face with children's 
constitutional rights and a jurisprudence generally sensitive to the rights of 
children.43 The case was also a first to see the Court engage with children's 
right to freedom of expression, and it did so amidst concerns about school 
discipline. Le Roux has potential consequences for the future, considering 
that wide access to means of electronic communication creates new 
opportunities for children to express themselves, including in ways which 
may harm others.44  
A mix of reactions was generated by the judgments.45 Surprisingly, the case 
has not received much attention from children's rights scholars. Mills has 
                                            
37  Le Roux para 66. 
38  Le Roux para 68. 
39  Le Roux paras 176, 190. 
40  Le Roux para 195. 
41  Le Roux paras 197, 199, 200. 
42  Restorative Justice Centre (represented by Professor Ann Skelton; Heads of 
Argument para 3). 
43  See, for example, Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 265. 
44  Restorative Justice Centre (represented by Professor Ann Skelton; Heads of 
Argument para 2). 
45  Buthelezi 2012 Obiter 719; Campbell 2011 SALJ 419; Fagan 2011 SALJ 395; Milo 
and Palmer 2011 http://www.thedailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-03-17-analysis-
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comprehensively criticised the majority for ignoring the best interests of the 
child in section 28(2) of the Constitution,46 and Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse 
have written critically of the contrast between the majority judgment and the 
tradition of the South African courts to give special protection to children.47 
5  A children's rights critique of the judgments  
The critical question which dominates Le Roux is whether, in the light of 
children's constitutional rights, children who are alleged to have defamed 
others should be treated differently from adults who defame. To this 
question the majority and minority gave contrasting answers. 
5.1  A critique of the majority judgment 
From a children's rights perspective, the major problem with Brand AJ's 
judgment is the absence of any serious consideration of the rights of 
children, which resulted in the defendants being treated like adults. While 
for Yacoob J the rights of children took centre stage, the majority simply 
found that they were "not irrelevant".48 The reasonable observer is 
construed exclusively based on adult standards, and no attention is given 
to the fact that the audience consisted of children, apart from mentioning 
that maintaining discipline at school was important and that the image 
undermined that endeavour. As mentioned above, all attempts to move the 
Court to develop the common law of defamation to take the rights of children 
into consideration were resisted by the majority of the judges.  
This is contrary to the Court's solid children's rights jurisprudence, which 
creates an informal expectation that children will be given a special legal 
treatment. The reasons for the marginalisation of the rights of children by 
the majority in Le Roux are not readily apparent. The majority was of the 
view that children’s right to freedom of expression (section 16 of the 
Constitution) was insufficiently canvassed before the courts to enable a 
balancing between "the freedom of expression of schoolchildren" and "the 
dignity of teachers – including their reputation".49  
                                            
schoolboy-scandals-and-defamation-in-sa-quo-vadis; Neethling and Potgieter 2011 
Obiter 721; Stubbs 2013 Stell LR 377; De Vos 2011 
http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/is-the-reasonable-person-a-homophobic-
prude/. 
46  Mills 2014 SALJ 847. 
47  Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 672. 
48  Le Roux para 82. 
49  Le Roux paras 127, 128. 
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Section 28(2) of the Constitution (the best interest's provision) would 
however have been50 an alternative legal ground on which to base the 
insertion of child-focused aspects into the majority's reasoning (and one 
which, arguably, has provided a base from which procedural requirements 
can be regarded less stringently).51 In the South African law, section 28(2) 
of the Constitution plays a triple role. It is a right in itself, a principle of 
interpretation for the rights in section 28(1) of the Constitution (the more 
specific rights of the child), and a tool for establishing the scope of the 
constitutional rights of other rights holders and their potential limitations.52 
The distinctions and the overlaps among these functions are yet to be 
clarified,53 but in prior cases, regardless of the technique used, section 28(2) 
of the Constitution has been associated with a special and a more 
favourable legal treatment for children.54 While the best interests standard 
permeates the reasoning of Yacoob J, it is at least surprising to see it 
completely side-lined in the reasoning of the majority.  
The opacity of the majority's position vis-à-vis the application of section 
28(2) of the Constitution leaves room for speculation. Did the majority 
consider that section 28(2) of the Constitution was not applicable, as 
deemed possible by the Court in S v M?55 Such reasoning would have been 
difficult to justify in a case concerning children directly, rather than indirectly 
as was the case in S v M, where the issue was first raised. Was the majority 
concerned that the application of section 28(2) of the Constitution would 
have required it to prioritise automatically the interests of the children at the 
expense of Dr Dey's legitimate interests? Such concern would ignore that 
the Court's own jurisprudence shows that "paramount importance" does not 
mean that children's interests trump all other interests.56 Arguably, a 
possible reason for the majority's reluctance to engage with section 28(2) of 
the Constitution was that the law of defamation is poorly equipped to 
                                            
50  Section 28(2) of the Constitution reads: "A child's best interests are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child". 
51  AD v DW (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae; Department for Social 
Development as Intervening Party) 2008 3 SA 183 (CC) (hereafter AD v DW) para 
55; Van der Burg v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 2 SACR 331 (CC) 
(hereafter Van der Burg) para 68. Admittedly, in a case like Le Roux, it may be 
pushing it too far to argue that a "relaxation" of procedural rules on the basis of the 
best interests would have dispensed with the need to present comprehensive 
arguments on the issue.  
52  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights". 
53  Bonthuys 2006 IJLPF 23; Couzens 2013 SALJ 672.  
54  For a more detailed review of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on s 28(2) 
of the Constitution, see Couzens "Contribution of the South African Constitutional 
Court" 521. 
55  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) (hereafter S v 
M) para 25. 
56  De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2003 12 
BCLR 1333 (CC); S v M.  
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accommodate children's specificities, unlike family law or juvenile justice, 
where the common law makes allowance for such. Further, much of the 
normative power of section 28(2) of the Constitution has been contoured in 
public law cases directed against the state, or in family law and child 
protection cases. Le Roux raised a different, more difficult legal issue: the 
horizontal application of section 28(2) of the Constitution to matters other 
than family law or child protection, which the majority refrained from 
addressing.  
In the end, whatever the discomfort of the majority with the application of 
section 28(2) of the Constitution, it sits badly with the Court's position that 
the rights in section 28 of the Constitution "are an enforceable precept 
determining how officials and judicial officers should treat children"57 and 
that "the courts are essentially guarding the best interests of a child, not 
simply settling a dispute between litigants".58 
5.2  A critique of Yacoob J's judgment 
Yacoob J's minority judgment is clearly a child-focused judgment whose 
outcome is favourable to children. Does this make it, however, a children's 
rights judgment? The judgment has been met with approval by children's 
rights academics,59 but is it all well with the manner in which Yacoob J 
approached the issues? 
As mentioned in the introduction, defining a children's rights perspective to 
legal reasoning is work in progress, but regardless of how the concept is 
defined children's rights judgments cannot be less rigorous than other 
judgments. Arguably Yacoob J's judgment may be problematic in this 
regard. The judge talks about children's freedom of expression but gives 
little formal attention to a child-specific legal content of this right. Instead, 
Yacoob J's judgment ends up relying heavily on the normative power of 
section 28(2) of the Constitution. It is submitted that section 28(2) of the 
Constitution should not be used as an "easy way out" of difficult legal issues, 
and decisions based on it should not be less rigorous than other judgments. 
It is a loss to the development of the rights of children that Yacoob J did not 
use his child-focused observations to develop the legal content of children's 
rights to freedom of expression rather than to "pad" his best interests 
reasoning. Further, Yacoob J does not identify the specific right or rights 
which he applies. Instead, he refers to several constitutional rights - dignity 
and equal worth;60 children's right to be cared for at the school (section 
                                            
57  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 6 
SA 632 (CC) para 25 (fn omitted). 
58  AD v DW para 55. 
59  Mills 2014 SALJ 847; Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 672. 
60  Le Roux para 49. 
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28(1)(b) of the Constitution); and to be protected against maltreatment, 
neglect, abuse and degradation (section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution)61 - 
without giving them focused attention or explaining their relevance to the 
case. This observation may be criticised as being legally formalistic, but it is 
necessary to point out that the other judges found it necessary to be more 
specific. As Skweyiya J correctly notes, none of the more specific rights in 
section 28(1) of the Constitution were directly relevant. Thus, reliance on 
section 28(2) was warranted.62  
To correctly rely on section 28(2) of the Constitution applied independently, 
Yacoob J should arguably have identified the entitlements arising 
independently therefrom, and then apply them to the context. In the present 
writer's view, this was not done, and as a consequence Yacoob J's 
reasoning exposes one of the weaknesses in the South African children's 
rights jurisprudence: the absence of clarity in relation to the use of the best 
interests of the child provision in the Constitution as a self-standing right.63 
It may be that, like the majority, Yacoob J thought that procedural reasons 
prevented him from considering the application of section 15 of the 
Constitution and giving it a child-specific content. If that was so, Yacoob J 
does not say it. It would have done more service to the cogency of his 
judgment to acknowledge the issue than to gloss over it. 
Paradoxically, although Yacoob J's judgment is child-focused, this Justice's 
use of children's rights is not the most effective. Children's rights are used 
as part of the context in which the alleged defamatory picture is to be 
assessed (its meaning and its defamatory character). This, arguably, does 
not capitalise on the full constitutional force of these rights: they are part of 
the context, but their normative impact is unclear. Skweyiya J seems to 
attempt a clarification of the normative impact of the rights of children by 
pointing out that section 28(2) of the Constitution 
… forms the basis and starting point from which the matter is to be considered. 
Once the considerations relevant to this foundation are clearly cemented, one 
can then begin to examine the other rights that enter the balance …64 
Skweyiya J's judgment is, however, too short for a full and convincing 
application of this approach. 
One of the surprising aspects of Yacoob J's reasoning is that although 
effectively this Justice develops the common law of defamation by relying 
                                            
61  Le Roux para 57. 
62  Le Roux para 120. 
63  Bonthuys 2006 Int'l J Children's Rts 23; Couzens 2013 SALJ 672. 
64  Le Roux para 211. See also Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 2 SA 168 (CC) paras 38-41 (hereafter 
Teddy Bear Clinic). 
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on the rights of children, this is not explicitly acknowledged. Nowhere in his 
judgment is there a reference to sections 8(3)65 or 39(2)66 of the 
Constitution, although these are both sections that would have bolstered 
Yacoob J's reasoning and, perhaps, have allowed him to gather more 
support for his judgment from the other members of the Court.67  
To conclude this point, while Yacoob J's judgment is a child-focused 
judgment, it may fall short of being a children's rights judgment because of 
his insufficiently clear application of children's rights. With respect, Yacoob 
J may have engaged in a similarly problematic reasoning in C v Department 
of Health and Social Development, Gauteng,68 where he relied heavily on 
section 28(2) of the Constitution, without giving much formal attention to the 
more specific section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution. In the current state of the 
law, this approach is not necessarily incorrect as there is no precedent 
requiring that the independent application of section 28(2) of the 
Constitution is subsidiary to the application of more specific rights in section 
28(1) of the Constitution. However, the shunning of a right that is directly 
relevant in favour of a more general provision requires some justification. 
Interesting criticism of Yacoob J's judgment comes from Buthelezi, who 
argues that Yacoob J was "misdirected by his unwarranted bias towards the 
children's rights",69 and that the children in casu were not vulnerable, nor 
was their dignity at stake. While this criticism may be misplaced,70 it 
nonetheless prompts reflection on some basic yet complex issues 
pertaining to the legal treatment of children. Is a children's rights approach 
a matter of "unwarranted bias", as feared by Buthelezi, or a "mantra for the 
converted" who are deliberately oblivious to an orderly application of the 
law? Are judgments like C v Department of Health, Gauteng and Yacoob 
                                            
65  Section 8(3) of the Constitution reads: "When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights 
to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court (a) in order to give 
effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to 
the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and (b) may develop rules 
of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with 
section 36(1)". 
66  Section 39(2) of the Constitution reads: "When interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights". 
67  One explanation may be that Yacoob J's reasoning does not rely directly on the 
constitutional provisions he mentions (ss 9, 10, 28(1)(b) and (d), 28(2)) of the 
Constitution, but rather on previous case-law which interpreted them. Yacoob J 
might have seen his judgment as building on those precedents, which were already 
constitutionally infused, with no need to refer directly to the constitutional provisions 
which would authorise his approach. 
68  C v Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng 2012 2 SA 208 (CC). 
69  Buthelezi 2012 Obiter 723. 
70  The application of the rights of children can hardly constitute “bias” when such rights 
are constitutionally protected and the judges are mandated by the Constitution to 
protect them (ss 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution).  
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J's judgment in Le Roux, together with the children's rights academia's 
failure critically to engage with them, perhaps maintaining a perception that 
children's rights are some sort of legal misfits? Does the frequency with 
which the constitutional provision on the best interests of the child is used 
in judgments perpetuate the perception that children's rights have a lesser 
"legal pedigree"?71  
Tobin has noted that perspectives on the rights of children vary significantly 
between children's rights supporters and those for whom these rights "are 
not self-evident".72 For the latter, children's rights may be invisible or can be 
rejected.73 This is so because there is an insufficient conceptual 
development of children's rights which erodes their legitimacy74 and limits 
their appeal beyond the community of child rights supporters. Is it possible 
that children's rights supporters have inadvertently created a perception of 
bias because of the lack of critical discourse within children's rights 
research,75 or because of the activist perspective which children's rights 
research sometimes takes?76  
The perception of bias raised by Yacoob J's approach is clearly linked to 
this Justice’s applying a different legal treatment to children. Yacoob J has 
done so by developing the common law of delict in order to accommodate 
children's special features (ie age, lack of maturity) and to reflect the 
constitutional obligations of the state and its institutions (including its courts) 
to respect and protect the rights of children. A fair criticism of such an 
approach, which is anchored in the Constitution, ought to be accompanied 
by a further inquiry into the reasons which may have prompted senior judges 
to develop the common law instead of mechanically applying the existing 
legal principles. Seen in this light, Yacoob J's reasoning does not appear as 
"biased" but rather as constitutionally mandated. Yacoob J's judgment 
invites one to question the validity of defamation law rules which allow 
children who are doli capax to be treated like adults, prima facie contrary to 
the Constitution, which recognises "the right of a child to be a child and enjoy 
                                            
71  It is worth noting that heavy reliance on s 28(2) of the Constitution is not inevitable, 
and significant children’s rights cases have been decided by the Constitutional Court 
with no reliance on this section (ie Christian Education South Africa v Minister of 
Education 2000 10 BCLR 1051 (CC) (hereafter Christian Education South Africa); 
MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC)), or by utilising it in 
a more structured and legally predictable fashion (Teddy Bear Clinic).  
72  Tobin 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 398.  
73  Tobin 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 398. 
74  Tobin 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 398. 
75  Reynaert, Bouverne-De Bie and Vandevelde 2012 Int'l J Children's Rts 155.  
76  On the tensions between the “role of a distant scientific observer, and the role of 
human rights advocate” played by children's rights researchers, see Hanson "Does 
Practice Also Work in Theory?" 636. 
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special care".77 Notably, the same children would be treated differently from 
adults, and generally less harshly, in other areas of law. Indeed, why is it 
that in the field of criminal law, which deals with behaviour considered so 
serious as to warrant criminalisation by the state, children who are criminally 
responsible (regardless of their age) are given special legal treatment, but 
in the law of defamation, which concerns harm of a less serious nature, this 
special legal treatment is denied to doli capax children?78 The answer is, 
arguably, in the legal tradition and the evolution of the South African law, 
which Yacoob J rightly questioned through the prism of children's 
constitutional rights, which he was entitled to do under the Constitution.79 
Perhaps in the current state of the transformation of the law under the 
influence of the Constitution, such inquisitive assessment may require a 
certain degree of bias or advocacy if this is understood as a willingness on 
the part of judges to look further than the mechanical application of the law 
and to question its fitness when applied to children. Arguably, as long as the 
law ignores children as different legal subjects, "bias" or "advocacy 
approaches" may be unavoidable and to a certain degree desirable. This is 
so especially in a legal system where judges have legitimate control over 
the development of the (common) law80 and are empowered to assess the 
constitutionality of laws. 
The second issue raised by Buthelezi's comments concerns children's 
vulnerability and dignity as the justification for their differential legal 
treatment. In South African law children are treated differently in many 
respects, and the case-law has created a "distinct vision of children",81 
reflected in a "constitutional childhood" which encompasses "protection 
coupled with emancipation" and "freedom to explore blended with adult 
guidance and compass".82 But what the basis of this "distinct vision" is may 
not always be clear. Ought children to be treated differently because of their 
de facto vulnerability assessed on a case-by-case basis, or simply because 
they are different (from adults), and have a "unique worth"83 or a 
unique/different dignity? According to some authors, it is "[t]he special 
                                            
77  S v M per Sachs J para 17. 
78  In criminal law, for example, children benefit from a more favourable legal treatment 
(pre-trial, trial and sentencing).  
79  Section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
80  Other judges have utilised this constitutional power. Very recently, for example, in 
YG v S 2017 ZAGPJHC 290 (19 October 2017), Keightly J (concurred with by 
Francis J) raised ex officio the constitutionality of the defence of reasonable 
chastisement. The two Justices declared the defence unconstitutional, and 
developed the common law in line with the requirements of the Constitution.  
81  Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 671. 
82  Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 672 (all quotes). 
83  Term used by Tobin 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 407. 
M COUZENS PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  17 
vulnerability that provide[s] the justification for special protection",84 while 
for others there is a certain overlap between vulnerability and dignity in that 
children's vulnerability makes their dignity unique or different.85 While in 
some cases distinguishing between vulnerability and dignity as a basis for 
a different legal treatment may not be necessary, for children such as those 
in Le Roux this distinction is useful: if children are not seen as 
(conventionally) vulnerable, they may still qualify for a special legal 
treatment because of their unique dignity.  
Deciding which children are vulnerable depends on how vulnerability is 
defined. While in the context of an uncomplicated medical treatment, for 
example, a competent child may not be considered vulnerable,86 a child 
offender, although criminally capable, remains vulnerable and subject to a 
different legal treatment. Further, certain forms of vulnerability are already 
(and readily) acknowledged by the law and the courts (ie children in need 
of protection, children in conflict with the law, child victims, child witnesses) 
while there may be a lack of agreement in relation to other forms of 
vulnerability. For example, the children in Le Roux might not be seen as 
vulnerable according to the readily accepted versions of vulnerability, but 
may appear as vulnerable if they are seen as part of a class of persons 
whose special, relevant features were ignored throughout the development 
of the law of defamation. This raises the further question as to whether a 
special legal treatment should be granted based on individual vulnerability 
or on the vulnerability of children as a special class of individuals. The 
manner in which these issues are addressed has an impact on whether the 
children in Le Roux ought to have received differential legal treatment. 
What constitutes child-sensitive, differential legal treatment can also be 
contentious. In the specific context of Le Roux, would the requirements 
regarding delictual capacity, the crafting of a new remedy (ie an apology) 
and a reduction in pecuniary damages perhaps be sufficient to protect 
children's vulnerability or dignity in defamation law? How can child-sensitive 
legal responses remain mindful of other people's vulnerabilities, and how 
should judges balance protection with responsibility and aspirations for 
autonomy?  
The theoretical questions raised above require more attention than can be 
provided here. Suffice it to say that in South Africa the case law seems to 
provide support for both visions (one founded on vulnerability87 and the 
                                            
84  Tobin 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 407 giving the example of medical treatment.  
85  Dixon and Nussbaum 2011-2012 Cornell L Rev 553. 
86  Tobin 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 429.  
87  In Centre for Child Law para 26 Cameron J talks about "children's greater physical 
and psychological vulnerability".  
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other on dignity88), and perhaps a combination of the two.89 Judicial views 
have developed on a case-by-case basis in response to the circumstances 
of each case, and they do not reflect a unitary approach. However, judges 
cannot be expected to theorise about the rights of children, a task which 
remains mainly with academia.  
6  Conclusions  
In part 2 two questions were chosen as a focus for this contribution: Is a 
children's rights approach to judging inherent where the rights of children 
are entrenched in constitutions or children's rights statutes? The second 
question interrogated whether a children's rights approach is inherent in 
judgments with a child-favourable outcome. A "children's rights approach" 
was tentatively defined as an approach in which children's rights are 
acknowledged and applied when engaged, and are treated rigorously, with 
careful attention to their legal content. 
In relation to the first question, the majority decision in Le Roux shows that 
the formal protection of the rights of children, even at the highest level (ie 
the constitutional level), and a solid children's rights jurisprudence do not 
guarantee that a children's rights approach would be taken by judges at all 
times. The majority in Le Roux eschewed the constitutional rights of children 
and avoided applying them in areas of the common law where children's 
rights are not often considered.90 Le Roux confirms academic views that 
entrenching children's rights in legal documents is insufficient to ensure their 
consistent application and their visibility to those for whom such rights are 
not "self-evident".91 Ultimately, the majority was unpersuaded that they 
ought to administer a different legal treatment to the children in this case 
and develop the law so as to accommodate such treatment.  
In relation to the second question, Yacoob J's judgment, despite its many 
positive aspects (ie its child-friendly outcome and its child-focused 
conceptualisation of legal issues) might not necessarily be a children's 
                                            
88  In S v M, Sachs J talks about "every child [having] his or her own dignity" (para 18), 
which is manifested in the need to experience and develop (para 19). Also see Teddy 
Bear Clinic para 55; Christian Education South Africa paras 15, 50. 
89  Le Roux per Yacoob J paras 46 and 53; Le Roux per Skweyiya J para 212. 
90  See, by contrast, the ease with which the Court uses the rights of children against 
the state in C v Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng 2012 2 SA 
208 (CC); J v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 ZACC 13; Teddy Bear 
Clinic. 
91  Tobin 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 397. Tobin makes the point that some policy-makers 
and academics still manifest "a level of resistance, scepticism and uncertainty about 
the utility of rights for children" (Tobin "Development of Children's Rights" 26-27). 
Similar views have been expressed earlier by Fortin Children's Rights and the 
Developing Law; Human "Theory of Children's Rights" 244. 
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rights judgment. This is so because of the arguably imprecise use of the 
rights of children. Yacoob J makes a good case that children ought to be 
treated differently, and shows that they have been so treated in the Court's 
own case law. What Yacoob J failed to do was to persuade the majority that 
the law either accommodates or requires that such different treatment be 
granted. Arguably, the cogency of his argument and its appeal to other 
judges may have been increased if Yacoob J had clearly isolated the legal 
foundation of his reasoning (section 28(2) of the Constitution applied 
independently) and spelled out its legal content. However, identifying the 
legal content of section 28(2) of the Constitution when applied 
independently (and not together with other rights) would have been a major 
task for Yacoob J to have undertaken, given that clarity has been lacking in 
the Court's jurisprudence on this point. It is submitted, however, that had 
Yacoob J tried to do so, his judgment would have been more persuasive. 
The above questions were dealt with in the context of the current interest in 
defining what constitutes a child rights approach or perspective to judging. 
But there are other ways in which Le Roux contributes to unwrapping the 
multi-dimensional concept of a children's rights perspective in judging. It 
arguably does so in two ways: first, by giving an indication of what may 
constitute the substantive features of such approach; and second, by 
illustrating some of the potential obstacles to employing it.  
As far as the substantive aspects are concerned, Le Roux illustrates that 
taking a child rights approach may require the construction of legal 
arguments in support of a different legal treatment to be applied to children. 
This is most likely to occur in those areas of law where statutes, common 
law and case law have not yet been adapted to respond to children as 
different subjects of the law.92 Thus, a children's rights approach involves a 
search for legal grounds which justify a distinct legal treatment for children, 
which rests on the willingness of judges to interrogate the existing legal 
framework and its suitability to children, as done by Yacoob J in this case. 
The classic ground which has justified a different treatment for children has 
been their vulnerability, thus the attraction which the concept of best 
interests (constitutional, statutory, or common law) has exercised as a legal 
justification for the protection of such vulnerabilities. However, a case such 
as Le Roux exposes the danger of too quickly relying on a classic view of 
vulnerability. There, the majority did not see the children as vulnerable, and 
consequently made no effort to treat them differently in law. This stresses 
the need for a reassessment of how children's vulnerability is understood; 
                                            
92  In areas of law such as family law, child protection or juvenile justice, the legal 
institutions have been adapted to a certain extent by the legislature, and thus the 
structure of reception for the rights of children is much more favourable. 
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and, concomitantly, the need to explore other legal grounds to justify a 
different legal treatment for children.  
In South Africa, the provision arguably most often relied on to secure a 
distinct legal treatment for children is section 28(2) of the Constitution, either 
by itself or in combination with other constitutional provisions. The limited 
support given to Yacoob J's judgment by the other members of the bench 
in Le Roux suggests that there may be limitations to this approach.93 When 
looked at in the context of the statements made by the majority,94 there may 
be an indication that the time is ripe to diversify the legal grounds on which 
a differential treatment of children is sought. Sections 9(1) (equal protection 
and benefit of the law) or 10 (dignity) of the Constitution, for example, are 
worth exploring as general frameworks.  
The second way in which it is suggested that Le Roux contributes to 
understanding the elusive concept of a children's rights approach to judging 
is by unveiling some of the potential obstacles to it. Le Roux shows that 
there may be resistance to a children's rights approach, especially in areas 
of law where the rights of children have not yet penetrated. The majority 
judgment and some academic commentary suggest a certain reserve in 
relation to the rights of children making inroads in such areas of law, 
reflecting perhaps a perception that the rights of children may exist in a 
world of their own, somehow insular and not necessarily part of the legal 
mainstream.  
The approaches taken to the conceptualisation of the legal issues in Le 
Roux by the majority and by Yacoob J respectively are in such stark contrast 
that the judgements do not speak to each other in relation to the rights of 
children. The split views of the judges and the type of critical comments 
attracted by Yacoob J's judgment expose the rift between "believers and 
non-believers"95 in the rights of children, between those for whom these 
rights are "self-evident"96 and those for whom they are not. This throws 
doubt over the consistency which can be expected from the courts in using 
a children's rights approach. It questions the strength of the actual support 
base for the rights of children even in legal systems where a strong formal 
basis exists. All of these ought to prompt an analysis into why it is that 
formally recognised rights generate such seemingly irreconcilable positions, 
both of which attract supporters.  
                                            
93  Unfortunately, because the majority side-lined the rights of children, such 
weaknesses are not acknowledged in their judgement. 
94  Which indicated a potential openness to other legal grounds to justify a differential 
legal treatment for children. See part 3.1 above. 
95  Reynaert, Bouverne-De Bie and Vandevelde 2012 Int'l J Children's Rts 155.  
96  Tobin 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 397. 
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It is possible that the insufficient theoretical clarity97 in children's rights may 
contribute to widely differing approaches in relation to their relevance for 
adjudication. Le Roux could be seen as an illustration of how the insufficient 
theoretical development of the rights of children has an impact on their 
protection. This was a difficult case in that it involved the horizontal 
application of an elusive constitutional provision (section 28(2) of the 
Constitution) in an area of law seldom exposed to the influence of the rights 
of children. The answers to the legal questions raised were not readily 
available in statutes, common law or case law. It is in the more general 
concepts or approaches in relation to the relationship between children and 
the law, and in relation to what justifies a special treatment for children, that 
the Court might have found some guidance. However, theoretical 
perspectives on children and their rights are perhaps stuck in an 
insufficiently sophisticated vulnerability refrain, unhelpful for the Court in a 
case like Le Roux.  
The lack of sufficient clarity as to the theoretical foundation of the rights of 
children may also create a perception that such rights are exotic or esoteric, 
and difficult to fit into the legal mainstream.98 With the development of 
children's rights litigation, it can be said that such perceptions are 
incorrect.99 Regardless, they should not be too quickly dismissed, and 
instead should be used as starting points for critical reflection. One could, 
for example, reflect on whether the children's rights discourse might not 
have developed in a "bubble", away from the general legal discourse, and 
thus it might have itself contributed to a certain extent to generating such a 
perception. Further, one could reflect on whether this might not have 
resulted in a children's rights discourse oblivious to the tensions and 
idiosyncrasies which may be present in the operation of the rights of 
children.  
Indeed, in children's rights literature it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between children's rights advocacy and scientific research.100 Much of the 
children's rights literature lacks a critical approach to such rights and the 
manner in which they articulate with the rest of the law.101 There may be an 
unspoken concern that critical views may undermine their still fragile and 
                                            
97  Tobin 2013 Int'l J Children's Rts 397. 
98  It is perhaps the estrangement between the children's rights discourse and the "hard 
law" of delict that made the penetration of the rights of children difficult in Le Roux. 
99  Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency 2014 1 SA 604 (CC); Freedom Stationery (Pty) 
Ltd v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape 2011 JOL 26927 (E); Van der Burg.  
100  As acknowledged by Hanson "Does Practice Also Work in Theory?" 636. 
101  Instead, arguments are made that children's rights ought to be given effect, or even 
prevail. But for acknowledgement of the dangers of "rights talk" see Fortin Children's 
Rights and the Developing Law 9; Human "Theory of Children's Rights" 252. 
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underdeveloped edifice. The reverse, however, may be equally dangerous: 
the development of a parallel legal and academic discourse, estranged from 
the legal mainstream, and perceived as exotic and capricious, and whose 
logic is understood by only a few. The appeal that children's rights 
developed in this way would hold for judges, legal practitioners or outsiders 
is doubtful, and so is the likelihood of a children's rights approach being 
consistently followed.  
A robust critical discourse within the children's rights research community 
needs to develop so that these rights grow by confronting and addressing 
difficulties, contradictions and tensions. Arising from this writer's reflections 
on Le Roux, and thus by no means exhaustive, two possible suggestions 
for the development of a more critical children's rights discourse can be 
made. For example, judgments which are favourable to children should not 
be unreservedly endorsed by children's rights supporters simply because of 
their child-friendly outcome, if the legal reasoning is insufficiently 
persuasive. Criticism from within the children's rights community may 
contribute to refining the children's rights usage in similar subsequent 
cases, increasing the cogency of the legal reasoning and, hopefully, 
resulting in a wider and more sustainable judicial support for a children's 
rights approach. Second, the reference framework for children's rights 
research should be extended, and children's rights researchers should 
inquire more often into the difficulties of responding positively to children's 
rights arguments in the context of the existing legal framework, which as 
seen in Le Roux may not have been transformed by the constitutional rights 
of children. It is not argued here that one needs to take a defeatist approach 
and acquiesce to the status quo. Instead, what is proposed is that when 
children's rights arguments are not successful, the position of the decision-
maker or opinion-holder is not dismissed as opacity to the rights of children. 
Rather, as children's rights researchers, we should be asking ourselves if 
there are legitimate reasons for which the children's rights arguments have 
not been successful. Cogent concerns about the operation of the rights of 
children should be used as clues to help understand the obstacles to a wider 
adherence to "thinking legal" in a children's rights framework. A better 
understanding of such concerns by the children's rights researchers would 
enable them to construct more persuasive arguments, which would 
resonate not only with the children's rights "converts" but with a wider legal 
audience.  
The observations made in this contribution in relation to defining a children's 
rights approach to judging arise from a specific case, in a specific area of 
law and in a particular legal system. A children's rights approach may look 
different in a case concerning children indirectly, in a family law context or 
in a different legal system. For example, in a different legal system, where 
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judges may not be constitutionally entitled to question the law, a children's 
rights approach may rest on different legal institutions and entail different 
things. However, there is a possibly universal foundation to a children's 
rights approach to judging, which may be pursued in many different ways, 
across diverse legal systems – that is, an alertness to children's uniqueness 
as subjects of the law, and the cultivation of a judicial mind open to exploring 
or developing the law in search of means to respond to that uniqueness. 
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